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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses a case study that examined the 
influence of cultural, organizational and automation 
capability upon human trust in, and reliance on, 
automation. In particular, this paper focuses on the design 
and application of an extended case study methodology, 
and on the foundational lessons revealed by it. 
Experimental test pilots involved in the research and 
development of the US Air Force’s newly developed 
Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System served as 
the context for this examination. An eclectic, multi-pronged 
approach was designed to conduct this case study, and 
proved effective in addressing the challenges associated 
with the case’s politically sensitive and military 
environment.  Key results indicate that the system design 
was in alignment with pilot culture and organizational 
mission, indicating the potential for appropriate trust 
development in operational pilots. These include the low-
vulnerability/high risk nature of the pilot profession, 
automation transparency and suspicion, system reputation, 
and the setup of and communications among organizations 
involved in the system development.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the increase of automation in aviation, inappropriate 
reliance on automation becomes an increasingly relevant 
issue [11]. Misuse and disuse of automation characterize 
inappropriate reliance [6]. Misuse is described as the 
reliance on an automated system for something other than 
its intended purpose and disuse is the disengaging of the 
automation [6, 11]. Research has shown that reliance on 
automation depends on many factors, including the trust 
that the operator places in the automation and issues related 
to the capability and complexity of the automation [9]. In 
particular, trust has been shown to be a meaningful concept 
guiding human-automation reliance similar to the way trust 
mediates the relationships between individuals, between 
organizations, and between individuals and organizations 
[3, 5, 9, 12]. The fundamental premise of trust is the 
willingness of an individual to be vulnerable to the actions 
of another entity [9], may be it a person or a machine (i.e., 
automation). Lee and See [6] conducted a comprehensive 
review of the studies in the area of trust in automation, 
using the review as the basis for an integrative view linking 
organizational, sociological, interpersonal, psychological, 
and neurological perspectives on inter-personal trust to the 
issue of human-automation trust. In particular, they found 
that there is a general lack of data on, or research that 
examines, how cultural and organizational factors influence 
human-automation trust and reliance. Furthermore, while 
some studies have shown that these factors can influence 
human-automation interaction in unexpected ways, they 
have been mostly confined to experiments that examine the 
effects of a limited set of independent variables in a well-
controlled environment. In actual operations, interactions 
between humans and automation usually take place in 
settings where there are many more variables of interest 
than data points available, and where the investigators do 
not have control over the events. Thus, to build on existing 
experimental data, and to lay the foundation for future 
research, it is essential to capture the richness of the 
phenomenon and the extensiveness of the real-life context 
in which human interacts with automation.  The work 
presented in this paper sought to address this in the context 
of a case study of an actual military automated system. 
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Practical lessons learned and real-world perspectives of the 
appropriateness of reliance (i.e., where trust and use of 
automation matches system capabilities) are identified.  
Moreover, in addition to a standard approach examining 
how intrinsic properties of automation influences reliance, 
our emphasis on cultural and organizational factors allowed 
us to examine how human-automation reliance can be 
influenced in ways that are less directly related to the 
characteristics of the automation.  Finally, the case study 
method presented here facilitates the collection of evidence 
from multiple sources, thus utilizing converging operations 
to identify the presence of latent variables or constructs 
(e.g., trust, distrust) in a triangulating fashion. 
To identify foundational lessons and best practices about 
appropriate reliance on automation, our research approach 
involved conducting a case study of key Department of 
Defense (DOD) personnel with experience in operating and 
developing a military automated system. The Automatic 
Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) was 
selected as the context for this case study which, in turn, 
employs a multi-case design. Cultural, organizational, and 
automation capability factors are studied through three 
interrelated cases: 1) Auto-GCAS experimental test pilots; 
2) Auto-GCAS engineers; and 3) management who lead 
and oversee the Auto-GCAS program.  This paper reports 
data on the experimental test pilots (ETPs), and future 
papers will address engineers and managers.   
The remainder of the paper first discusses the methodology 
and methods utilized, and then presents lessons learned 
from the methodological research design and 
implementation processes, and key findings on the 
influence of automation capability, cultural, and 
organizational factors on trust development. In the last 
section, conclusions and implications for using the results 
of this research to add to the body of knowledge on human 
automation trust are discussed.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
Extended Case Study Methodology 
Our methodology was inspired by Michael Burawoy, who  
proposed in his 1991 book, Ethnography Unbound [2], to 
combine the advantages of two traditions, qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, of empirical evidence and theories. 
Burawoy emphasized the contribution of qualitative 
research in gaining a “Verstehen” understanding (i.e., 
understanding the meaning of actions from the actor's point 
of view) of the meanings and values of the people we 
study. By immersing themselves into the culture and world 
of their subjects, ethnographers can gain a deeper 
understanding of the norms and values of that group, which 
provides a subjective worldview of the research that cannot 
be gained from detached surveys or interviews. Qualitative 
methodology that utilizes methods like ethnographic field 
notes, participant observation, and open-ended questions 
provide a richer set of data, which makes it possible to 
introduce a subject’s interpretation into conclusions. This 
subjective, complex, and in-depth process provides context 
and completeness to information gathered from the 
population. On the other hand, Burawoy notes, quantitative 
methodologies, that include using surveys and closed 
question interviews, can provide a larger N and a basis for 
comparison between different populations or individuals. 
Studies utilizing quantitative methodologies are often quick 
to complete, and very effective in gathering data to 
proposed questions, but they often create many more 
unanswered questions at the end. Using these 
methodologies together, theories concluded from the 
collected data can then be tested to contribute to the larger 
scientific enterprise of knowledge seeking. Burawoy also 
advocated the meticulous examination of local societal 
trends and institutional policies, and connection to the 
macro levels of these trends and policies, in order to 
understand how everyday life challenges or reinforces the 
hegemonic order [2]. By doing so, he advocated that 
researchers should be both empirically and theorically 
driven, and that they study cases in the context of macro 
trends. In the spirit of this advocacy, we attempted to 
examine the development of pilots’ trust on Auto-GCAS in 
context of the larger organizational and cultural systems of 
the Air Force, NASA and Lockheed/Martin. Taking from 
Burawoy, the theories generated from the data collection 
process are expanded to include macro ideologies; in this 
case study, for example, the military industrial complex is a 
macro idea that was used to aid in examining and 
explaining the organizational factors that influenced trust 
development of Auto-GCAS. Following Burawoy’s 
suggestions, the project’s research design expanded upon 
his theory to capture the complex and intricate world of 
ETPs within the organizational context of this project.   
Methods 
Figure 1 depicts the project’s extended case study 
methodology, which expands Burawoy’s extended case 
methodology to include not just participant-observation 
data, but also interview and survey data, in the analysis and 
discussion/revision of existing theories. Extended case 
methodology combines grounded theory and traditional 
research approaches.  
 The grounded theory approach sets the framework for the 
project’s primary sources, while the traditional research 
methodology provides the project’s secondary sources.  
Grounded theory is a qualitative methodological approach 
that is an inductive hypothesis generating, as opposed to a 
deductive quantitative hypothesis-testing approach. 
Hypotheses are generated from observing patterns that 
emerge out of ethnographic data, rather than extracting 
hypotheses from existing theories and then collecting data 
to test these hypotheses. Using grounded theory, the 
project aimed to answer research questions by using 
questionnaires, surveys, interviews with participants, field 
notes, and observations. These qualitative methods 
provide the ethnographic approach dimension to the 
study.   
 In contrast to grounded theory, traditional research tests 
theories in a deductive manner. In this project, the 
research team immersed itself in the current literature on 
human automation trust development, with an emphasis 
on automation capability, cultural, and organizational 
factors. This included doing extensive literature review 
on the cultures and organizations involved with the 
development and testing of Auto-GCAS, and using the 
results of this review to generate hypotheses to be tested 
after the synthesis of the literature review was completed.  
 
Figure 1: Research Design Process and Strategy 
Mirroring this dichotomous methodological approach, we 
divided the research team into two groups.   One group did 
an in-depth literature review on human-automation trust, 
Auto-GCAS and its predecessors, and the cultures and 
organizations involved with its development. Another 
group worked on open-ended interviewing and survey 
questions. NVivo, an ethnographic research software 
package, was used to code the data collected from 
interviews, questionnaires, field notes, observations, and 
the literature review. The team then used this to help 
identify trends and to establish a collective story out of the 
key events, people, and meetings that contribute to the 
development of trust in Auto-GCAS, and generate theories 
and hypotheses. Using both primary and secondary data, 
comments on existing theories about trust in automation 
can then be posed. Once theories were generated from both 
the traditional literature review, and from the grounded 
theory methods, these theories and hypothesis were 
compared to see if they converged or diverged from each 
other.  
Unique Challenges and Solutions 
To capture the influence of cultural and organizational 
factors, the research design process had to address a 
number of unique challenges.  The first was the research 
team’s lack of familiarity with ETP culture. ETPs reside 
within a small, tight-knit community in which cultural 
studies are not often conducted. Since the literature on ETP 
is limited, to effectively study how ETP culture influences 
trust development in automation, we had to first study and 
define ETP culture. However, this then led to another 
challenge, which was gaining access to selective personnel 
and recruiting ETPs to participate in the research, in 
coordination with the government contacts at the Flight 
Test Center and NASA.  Since this study was done within 
the context of the ETPs Air Force duties, traditional 
incentives (e.g., monetary) for experimental participants 
could not be offered.  In addition, by the nature of their 
profession, ETPs are small in number and have incredibly 
busy work schedules.  The environment in which Auto-
GCAS has been developed and tested also demanded 
respect from the research team in terms of understanding 
the history of the development of Auto-GCAS, and the 
political and sensitive nature of the respective military and 
government organizations involved. The research team also 
needed to quickly gain an adequate understanding of a 
highly technical topic (Auto-GCAS), along with a complex 
organizational structure (with respect to US Air Force and 
NASA technology development process) in order to 
effectively process literature and findings and to converse 
with personnel and participants. Geography also was a 
challenge because the research team was based in Los 
Angeles, California, while ETP locations ranged from 
Edwards, California to Arlington, Virginia. Part of the 
methods used in the study, as explained in the next section, 
involved interviews, which were ideally conducted face-to-
face and required traveling to several air force bases. As 
stated by Lee & See [6], there is a lack of extensive 
literature regarding cultural and organizational factors in 
human-automation trust development.  This provided less 
of an immediate literature foundation for the research team. 
In addition to these issues, the project also attempted to 
capture a large quantity of information within a short time 
frame of 18 months.    
To address these challenges, three main solutions were 
developed and implemented: 1) an agile implementation of 
methods, which allowed the research team to adapt to the 
opportunities emerged during our investigation and to the 
uniqueness of the population groups; 2) the utilization of 
key people who could assist in gaining entrée to 
participants and research sites, as well as providing 
information and insights; and 3) the research team 
developed cultural and technical competency in order to 
effectively interact with the ETP population and work 
within the constraints of the complex organizational 
structures. 
 
RESULTS 
Methodological Lessons Learned 
The extended case study research design and 
implementation described were effective for obtaining the 
necessary data and for analyzing the data to reveal 
foundational lessons about ETP trust development in Auto-
GCAS.  These were based upon the three main solutions 
implemented in this study. 
 Specifically, the agile implementation of the methods 
proved to be highly useful and beneficial. Initially, we 
planned for a 2-hour interview with the participants; 
however, after discovering the time constraints of 
participants, the method was restructured to include an 
online questionnaire that could be completed at each 
participants’ convenience with a follow-up 1-hour 
interview. Interviews were restructured to include open-
ended questions and follow-up questions based upon how 
the respondent completed the questionnaire. Field 
observations which were initially intended to just include 
observing mission testing were extended as permitted by 
the circumstances and access gained by the research 
team. As a result, the research team was able to immerse 
itself deeper into ETP culture by conducting numerous 
observations not only at the work place (i.e., during 
mission testing and at AFBs), but by formal 
congregations (e.g., ETP conferences), and informal 
gatherings (e.g., meals and post-work bonding social 
events).  
 The project also owes a large part of its success to the 
assistance from key personnel with entrée into the ETP 
community and various organizations.  These key 
personnel were able to provide valuable insights and 
feedback during the research process. They facilitated in 
obtaining access to several AFBs including Edwards, 
Nellis, Shaw, and Hill, as well as organizing visitation 
rights to observe mission tests (from pre-mission briefing 
to post-mission de-briefing).  They also assisted in 
recruiting 14 male and 1 female Caucasian, US born ETP 
participants, with ages ranging from 28 to 65 years old. 
All had flown Auto-GCAS and had a median of 2.5 years 
of experience working with Auto-GCAS.  The association 
with these participants also helped the research team 
establish credibility and trustworthiness in the 
communities of the participants. 
  Building and having a deep understanding and cultural 
competency with respect to the ETPs and their 
community also proved to be highly critical for, and 
beneficial to, the conduct of the study. The substantial 
efforts made by the research team to learn ETP culture 
not only helped the team understand the values and norms 
of the culture, but also helped them converse and interact 
with ETPs using their technical language and vernaculars.  
This, in turn, helped the team to gain respect, build 
rapport, and gain the trust of the ETPs. By strengthening 
that connection between the research team and the ETPs, 
the research team was able to gather necessary data.  
Influence of Automation Capability, Cultural, and 
Organizational Factors on Trust Development 
A number of key lessons and best practices regarding how 
automation capability, as well as cultural and 
organizational factors, influence ETPs trust in Auto-GCAS 
were identified and are summarized in this section. These 
findings are pulled from the analysis of interviews, field 
notes, participant observations, surveys and literature 
review.  
 For safety systems such as Auto-GCAS, determining the 
right threshold to take control away from the operator is 
critical for developing a system that does not impede or 
interfere with the operator.  Auto-GCAS was designed to 
automatically execute a roll to wings-level, 5-G recovery 
maneuver when the time available to avoid ground impact 
(TAAGI) is 1.5 seconds. This 1.5-second budget, 
established through flight tests in which ETPs flew 
towards terrain and rated the TAAGI in relation to their 
anxiety, was a design requirement that helps eliminate 
nuisance activations.  Nuisance activations that take away 
the control of the aircraft is aversive to both ETPs and 
operational F-16 fighter pilots, and the elimination of 
these false alarms is highly valued.  Having a nuisance 
free system builds appropriate trust on the system. The 
1.5 second budget is specifically designed to address the 
needs of the operator: F-16 pilots. Pilots stated in 
interviews that Auto-GCAS does not activate sooner than 
they would execute an evasive maneuver which increases 
their trust that Auto-GCAS will not interfere with their 
flight mission. This identified lesson is extremely 
valuable for developers of future safety systems with 
similar characteristics to Auto-GCAS.  
 It was found that national differences may have an 
influence on Auto-GCAS reliance/compliance. Ideally, 
participants were to include international pilots with 
Auto-GCAS experience, but those pilots were not able to 
be recruited for this study. Based on the responses drawn 
from the US born pilots, there was evidence indicate that 
national differences between air force pilots can influence 
reliance in automated technologies. A few pilots with 
exposure to international cultures cited that pilots from 
non-Western or Soviet nations who fly according to 
commands from centralized ground control stations may 
be more likely to comply with Auto-GCAS due to 
cultures that prefer conformity. It was also stated that 
Eastern Asian cultures with heavy conformity and 
adherence to hierarchy may also heavily rely on such 
autonomous technologies. This phenomenon is interesting 
and warrants further exploration. 
 In a survey rating their opinions of the Auto-GCAS 
engineers and managers/leaders, the majority of the ETPs 
rated “strongly agreed” that they trusted the Auto-GCAS 
engineering and management teams and that the 
engineers and managers were competent and they could 
have honest conversations with them.  Pilots stated they 
had an increased trust in Auto-GCAS before flying just 
by the positive opinions of the competency of the teams 
that worked on developing it. This opinion is consistent 
with the mutual respect that the research team observed 
among the ETPs, engineers, and managers in their 
interviews and personal relationships.  Thus, the nature of 
relationships among members of different 
occupations/organizations can have positive or negative 
influence on trust development. In the Auto-GCAS case, 
having respect and a positive opinion of other people’s 
work, profession, and organization, facilitated a positive 
trust in the automation they produce.      
 Generational differences affect the acceptance/use of 
automation. Participants often stated in their interviews 
that there were differences in terms of acceptance of 
automation between the older “fly-by-the-seat-of-your-
pants” generation and the young “Nintendo” generation. 
The younger generation of pilots grew up with more 
exposure and familiarity with automation which makes 
them more likely to accept new automated technologies. 
It was also observed during observations at SETP 
symposia that older pilots emphasized a need for relying 
on the pilot and that automation cannot replace the pilot. 
Thus, younger pilots then are more likely to accept and 
trust Auto-GCAS.  Given that the current composition of 
F16 pilots is made of mostly younger generation, it would 
be interesting to gain deeper understanding of the 
generational issues by observing their behavior and 
actions in using Auto-GCAS in actual operation.  
 The approval of Auto-GCAS’s funding was influenced by 
how its business case is developed and marketed to users 
and decision makers [15]. Auto-GCAS was often thought 
of as a safety system. In the interviews, it was revealed 
that combat systems often have a higher funding priority 
than safety systems. We learned of the idea that “CFIT 
weeds out the weak.” There is still an ideology with some 
decision makers that good pilots don’t crash, and 
therefore would not need a technology like Auto-GCAS. 
To address this, Auto-GCAS was marketed as a combat 
and safety improvement to both decision makers and end 
users. The background and credentials of the individual(s) 
who make and present this business case are also 
important [15]. For example, ETPs stated in the 
interviews that they are more likely to trust a new 
technology when it is presented by a peer pilot (instead of 
a manager or an engineer).  Thus, it can be seen that 
inherent organizational ideological differences may create 
a tier system of importance for different types of 
automated technologies (e.g., preference for combat 
capability improvements over safety capability 
improvements).  This tier system can foster distrust in 
systems lower on the totem pole.    
 ETPs reported that in the survey and interviews, healthy 
skepticism (also known as automation suspicion) is an 
integral part of their training, and is an essential part for 
developing and calibrating their trust as they gain more 
exposure and knowledge that the system works properly.  
The trust continuously calibrates to an appropriate level 
over repeated positive/negative exposures and 
experiences with the system. This notion of trust 
calibration is consistent with and substantiated by data 
collected on the ETPs’ trust evolution.  Specifically, we 
asked ETP participants to mark their initial and final trust 
of Auto-GCAS as a function of its perceived capability 
on a graph where a 45-degree line represents ideal trust 
calibration, i.e. a 1:1 relationship between trust and 
capability.  As such, this line separates the over-trust 
region (above the line) and the under-trust region (below 
the line).  The results are shown in Figure 2 for 11 ETPs 
who completed the graph.  The trend shows that pilots 
tend to begin at under-trust points but as they gain 
experience and exposure to Auto-GCAS, they began to 
calibrate their trust close to the ideal trust line.  However, 
their final trust is still slightly under the ideal line, 
indicating that ETPs maintain a dose of healthy 
skepticism in their trust calibration.  This tendency of 
skepticism can be attributed to a number factors, such as 
avoiding strong negative consequences of over-trusting, 
not having enough experience with the system, or the 
training philosophy inculcated in them during test pilot 
school.  It would be important in future field studies to 
determine which factors are the most dominant and at 
what point they are most relevant during the trust 
calibration process.  
 While Auto-GCAS was designed to prevent up to 98% of 
historical incidents and to work only for situations when 
the pilot is saturated with tasks or disoriented or 
unconscious (due to high acceleration), pilots can misuse 
the system if they over-trust it and believe that “Auto-
GCAS will always save them.”  This misbelief can cause 
the pilot to fly more aggressively or brazenly, and misuse 
Auto-GCAS as a combat tool.  Of the 15 participants, 
three commented that having Auto-GCAS would change 
the way they fly. Two participants also had a long history 
of exposure to Auto-GCAS and had opportunities to 
observe changes in flying of other pilots. One pilot stated 
that he “actually few lower more comfortably” as a result 
of flying with Auto-GCAS. A plausible explanation for 
this is that the pilot occupational culture pushes pilots to 
strive to become better fighters and to use every tool that 
they have to their advantage.  Thus, Auto-GCAS then can 
be misused by future operational pilots.  It would be 
beneficial to follow Auto-GCAS during actual operation 
to learn whether misuse would occur and the 
circumstances and reasons when this happens.   
 
Figure 2: Self report of trust evolution of ETPs with  
      Auto-GCAS 
 Pilots are trained to be independent, self-reliant, and 
make life-or-death decisions using real-time data, thus it 
would be reasonable to hypothesize that they would 
dislike letting automation take away control of the 
aircraft.  To gain a better understanding into this attitude, 
and its implications for automatic systems such as Auto-
GCAS, participants were asked to rate the highest level of 
Auto-GCAS automation that they would be comfortable 
with.  The Sheridan and Verplank [13,14] taxonomy on 
10 automation levels were used, where level 1 is lowest 
level (Human does the whole job up to the point of 
turning it over to the computer to implement) and level 10 
is the highest level (Computer does the whole job if it 
decides it should be done, and if so, tells human, if it 
decides that the human should be told). The majority of 
pilots indicated that they would be comfortable with level 
7 (Computer does whole job and necessarily tells human 
what it did).  This result at first seems surprising, but 
from a perspective of trust calibration and evolution, it 
reinforces the notion that having an extensive and 
positive experience with a technology facilitates 
acceptance of that technology’s high automation levels. It 
gives evidence that pilots can be accepting of a highly 
autonomous system that takes control away from them.  
Again, this result needs further validation with data from 
actual operation.  
 Automation transparency was an important topic that 
emerged in this study as it affected how pilots develop 
and calibrate their trust. Auto-GCAS has several different 
display features that contribute to its transparency to a 
pilot, one of which is the use of chevrons on the heads up 
display (HUD) as shown in Figure 3 (the chevrons are 
two arrow heads pointing at each other).   The chevrons 
will appear from the left and right sides of the HUD when 
the Auto GCAS systems detects a potential collision.  
These chevrons move toward the middle of the HUD and 
intersect at a TAAGI of 1.5 seconds, when a pull up 
maneuver occurs.  The interviews revealed a debate over 
whether the inclusion of chevrons is a positive or a 
negative feature of Auto-GCAS. Pilots provided two 
opposing arguments on whether chevrons should be an 
included feature on the fielded version of Auto-GCAS 
and if the chevrons should default to “on.” The chevrons 
provide feedback and help increase pilot awareness of an 
impending pull-up maneuver, however, it is a concern 
that the presence of the chevrons can alter the way in 
which pilots fly. For example, it can encourage them to 
become more brazen and aggressive.  Pilots may also 
attempt to fly closer to terrain and use the chevron 
symbology as an indicator of how close they are to 
collision. However, some pilots argue that the chevrons 
are beneficial, as they give feedback to the pilot and 
allow the pilot to execute his/her own maneuver before 
the automation.  The decision to have the chevrons be on 
or off by default during actual operation is a hotly 
debated topic.   Typically, Developmental Test (DT) 
pilots believe that chevrons should default off while 
Operational Test (OT) pilots believe they should default 
on. These debates suggest that the design for automation 
transparency needs to take into account and balance the 
benefits of having information and the misuse of the 
information.  It also seems reasonable to hypothesize that 
if ETPs have already calibrated trust during the 
developmental stages with transparency-driven features 
such as the chevrons, then operational pilots may not 
need to have the chevrons. This also suggests that 
differing groups of pilots may need differing types of 
transparency to facilitate appropriate trust. These are 
questions that deserve further examination.   
 By the high standards of their profession, only the best of 
the best pilots are selected to fly fighter aircraft. As such, 
these pilots possess a mindset of supreme confidence and 
low vulnerability, which they need in order to be effective 
in high-risk combat environments. This was supported by 
participant observations and responses in the surveys and 
interviews.  By the extension of this mindset, a number of 
pilots who commented in their interviews that Auto-
GCAS will be beneficial for their colleagues but they will 
not need it themselves (because they are 
competent/good). Pilots had a tendency to emphasis the 
need for Auto-GCAS as a benefit to the fighter pilot 
community, but not as a need for themselves. This 
attitude can lead to potential disuse of the system, and 
needs further investigation 
 
Figure 3: HUD image with Chevrons 
 Misinformation can have detrimental effects on the 
opinion and trust of a system because it affects the user’s 
initial perception of the system [5].  During the course of 
the project, a number of instances of misinformation with 
respect to Auto-GCAS appeared during interviews and 
participant observations. This included gossip that the 
system doesn’t work (when in fact Auto-GCAS was not 
installed on a crashed aircraft), or pilots believing that 
they have flown Auto-GCAS (when in fact they have 
flown with other systems). The misinformation can be 
attributed to the confusion from the heavy use of 
acronyms within government groups, the fielding of 
different systems with the same or similar names, the 
long developmental history of Auto-GCAS, and potential 
rumors spread by Auto-GCAS opponents. Consequently, 
distrust can be formed due to misinformation, creating a 
hurdle in fostering positive trust development.  
 
DISCUSSION & FUTURE RESEARCH 
Discussion 
The research design of the extended case study and the 
implementation strategies were effective for conducting the 
study in a military environment that possessed numerous 
challenges.  The methodological approach developed can 
be applied to study the cultural/organizational dimensions 
of human-automation trust in other technological systems.   
The lessons learned, best practices, and research issues 
emerged from this study add to the body knowledge in trust 
research in a number of ways. First, the present results 
speak to the importance of transparency [7] as an influence 
on trust of automated systems. Specifically, the current 
results show that avoiding false alarms by the system was 
beneficial to the trust development of the ETPs. The system 
was designed and tested to approximate the appropriate 
threshold of constraints (i.e., time available to avoid ground 
impact) before initiating an action. This relates to the social 
intent facet of transparency described by Lyons [7], and 
demonstrates the importance of system design having a 
focus on the needs/wants of the user. Not only does this 
suggest that systems should evidence “benevolent 
intentions” but it also shows the costs of false alarms within 
automated systems, particularly for safety systems that 
assume control of one’s aircraft. Second, the study shows 
that trust of automated systems can be calibrated through 
exposure and experience in real-world scenarios. In this 
instance, after pilots had experienced the successful 
initiation of the Auto-GCAS system, they were more likely 
to have positive trust perceptions associated with it. This 
consistent with prior research by Hancock and colleagues 
[4] who found that system performance was the strongest 
predictor of human trust of robotic systems. Finally, the 
present study confirms the potential for anomalous 
unintended consequences associated with automated 
systems [11]. Safety systems such as Auto-GCAS are 
designed to promote safe flight operations, and it is very 
effective at doing just that. Yet, the current study suggests 
that there may be times where a pilot engages in more risky 
flight patterns due to the understanding that the Auto-
GCAS will protect them from a crash. This finding is an 
exemplar for Parasuraman and Riley’s concept of “misuse” 
[11], caused by an over trust of a system. The use of a 
transparent HUD display (i.e., the Chevrons) was 
implicated as a potential root cause driving the future 
possible overreliance (misuse) on Auto-GCAS in 
operational F-16 pilots. This raises important issues for the 
research community to investigate what the appropriate 
mechanisms are to foster appropriate transparency for 
safety systems that are used in high-risk operations, such as 
combat.  Warfighters naturally seek to attain the highest 
level of performance possible, and as such, real-time 
transparency inputs may be used to calibrate one’s sense of 
boundary conditions afforded by one’s aircraft. There are a 
number of ways to instantiate transparency into human-
machine contexts [7], and future research is certainly 
warranted to help engineers anticipate how humans will 
respond to novel designs. This study’s findings can be used 
as the basis to explore how transparency mediates trust 
development.  This can be accomplished with empirical 
studies in the context of the chevrons in Auto-GCAS and 
its sister Air Force Auto-Air Collision Avoidance (Auto-
ACAS) system, which is currently under development and 
testing.  These empirical results could then be used to 
spearhead applied research in creating transparency-
oriented design principles and for infusing them into 
various phases of system development cycle. 
Limitations  
While the current study provided rich data from which to 
evaluate the utility and constraints associated with a 
complex form of automation, there were several limitations 
resulting from the methods employed. First, the target 
sample for the initial work involved test pilots and 
engineers associated with the Auto GCAS development and 
testing. The involvement of these individuals, while 
necessary, may have introduced a positivity bias into the 
results. Further, pilots without the extensive 
background/history with Auto GCAS may react differently 
to the technology than the ETPs who were very 
experienced in the technology. Future research is needed to 
examine reactions to Auto GCAS from pilots who were not 
involved in the development and testing of the system. A 
second limitation involves the lack of experimental 
methods used in the study. Given that the data were 
qualitative, one cannot derive causal inference from the 
data. Experimental studies are needed in order to identify 
causality within this domain, and one such experiment is 
briefly described below.  
Conclusions & Future Research Avenues 
The findings in this study suggest that Auto-GCAS design 
was in alignment with pilot culture and organizational 
mission, indicating a strong potential for appropriate trust 
development in operational pilots.  However, these findings 
are based on pre-deployment data. Because trust calibration 
is a dynamic process, spanning from the time when the 
system is first conceived until it goes into operation and 
retirement, it would be beneficial to conduct a field study 
of the deployment of Auto-GCAS with operational pilots. 
This is in order to collect data to validate the hypotheses 
and to examine the various research issues raised (e.g., 
potential Auto-GCAS misuse/disuse due to pilot 
occupational culture and/or operational circumstances, trust 
evolution from beginning of deployment to stages when 
opinions are stabilized).  Such a field study would generate 
data and results that could influence and improve the 
design of the class of systems that take away control from 
the operator while eliminating nuisance activations and 
preventing interference with the mission.   
Future research may also focus on better understanding 
trust in automation disparities originating from cross-
cultural differences, generational differences, and 
individual differences.  Cultures align to various forms of 
social norms, expectations, and value sets.  Prior research 
suggests that there are cultural differences in the domain of 
interpersonal trust [15], therefore differences in trust of 
automated systems in different cultural groups warrants 
future research consideration. Similar to individuals of a 
different cultural background, individuals of different age 
groups may also have differing expectations and comfort 
levels associated with novel technology. Research has 
shown that younger and older samples report different trust 
levels for novel automated tools involving 
anthropomorphic features, with younger individuals 
reporting higher trust relative to older individuals [10]. 
Thus, the speculation of younger pilots being more 
“comfortable” or “accepting” of the Auto-GCAS should be 
taken seriously and these effects should be given more 
systematic analysis.  Lastly, future research should examine 
how individual differences influence reliance on automated 
tools. One promising domain that links to the current study 
is the construct of suspicion [1]. ETPs reported an inherent 
suspicion of new tools, which may be indicative to their 
career field or training. Given recent advances in the 
domain of state suspicion in IT contexts [1] further research 
should examine what features of the technology, training, 
culture, or organizational doctrine are related to suspicion.   
Potential Experimental Design   
The qualitative data suggested that the use of Chevrons as a 
form of transparency be examined further to determine if 
this manipulation has a positive or negative impact on 
pilots use of the system. This experiment could explore 
how the presence of the Chevrons changes pilot behavior. 
For instance, using a repeated measures experiment 
researchers could provide some pilots with the Chevrons 
and others not during a simulation of the Auto GCAS 
system and explore whether one group evidences 
significant changes in altitude relative to a baseline 
condition. Other key metrics that could be included in this 
study are: trust in automation, efficacy in piloting at low 
altitudes, perceived risk, and attitudes toward safety.    
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